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CRJMINAL LAW CASE NOTES AND COMMENTS

determinations of admissibility as contrasted
with the ultimate determinations reflected in
the verdict.4 This factor is especially significant
to the defendant since his appeal may depend
upon what specific error he can show in the
proceedings below. 4'
CONCLUSION
The orthodox procedure offers both the
court and defendant certain distinct advantages that are not found in the New York or
Massachusetts methods. For example, since
the jury is required to consider only credibility
unhampered by preliminary considerations of
4oSee Stein v. New York, 346 U.S. 156 (1953.)
where the Supreme Court considered this problem,
"Under these circumstances, we cannot be sure
whether the jury found the defendants guilty by
accepting and relying, at least in part, upon the
confessions or whether it rejected the confessions
and found them guilty on other evidence" at 170.
In rejecting the defendant's claim that the New
York procedure violated his rights under the fourteenth amendment the Court said, "Despite'the
difficult problems raised by such jury trial, we will
not strike down as unconstitutional procedures so
long established and widely approved by state judiciaries, regardless of our personal opinion as to
their widsom" at 179.
" The suggestion has been made that special questions be employed. The United States Supreme
Court has pointed out that such a procedure has
not been used in the United States. Id. at 188. See
also Maguire & Epstein, Preliminary Questions of
Fact in Determiningthe Admissibility of Evidence, 40
HAzv. L. Rxv. 391, 395 (1927), where special questions concerning preliminary determinations are discussed and rejected as a "ponderous nuisance."

admissibility, the judge is permitted to give an
uncomplicated instruction. Furthermore, the
defendant is offered more protection against
the jury's considering his coerced confession,
because the orthodox rule is not based on the
delicate assumption that a jury will be able to
disregard evidence that has been placed before
them. In addition, the defendant, under the
orthodox procedure, is given a definite determination of the admissibility question. Where the
jury decides the issue of voluntariness, the
defendant and the appellate court have the
impossible task of disentangling this determination from the general verdict. In spite of
these factors, the trend in recent years has been
toward the New York view.4 A reversal of this
trend should result from a re-examination by
the courts of the objectives of the procedures
used to determine a confession's admissibility.
These objectives can best be served through the
adoption of t orthehodox procedure.
41 Wigmore termed the orthodox rule the majority
view. 3 WXiGmORE, EviDENcE § 861 (3d ed. 1940).
However, more recent writings note a trend toward
the New York procedure which makes it the majority view. McCoRmcx, EV3DENcE § 112 (1954); 2
WHARTON, Ci=N,%L EviDENCE § 355 (12th ed.
1955). A method of reversing this trend is illustrated
by a recent Kentucky statute. Ky. Rnv. STAT. §422.
110 (1953). The courts have interpreted this statute
as requiring them to discontinue the use of the New
York procedure and adopt the orthodox rule. Bass
v. Commonwealth, 296 Ky. 426, 177 S.W.2d 386
(1944); Herd v. Commonwealth 294 Ky. 154, 171

S.W.2d 32 (1943). See also, MoDE.L CoDE o EviDENcE rule 505 (1942); UNirons Ruixs or EviDENCE rule 8, which adopt the orthodox pro-

cedure.

ABSTRACTS OF RECENT CASES
Use of Confession Held to Violate Due Process Despite Absence of Physical CoercionFollowing the attempted rape of a local resident, the defendant, an uneducated Negro, was
apprehended by civilians. Police were summoned and the accused was jailed "on an open
charge of investigation." The day after his
arrest, a Sunday, began a ten-day period of
detention during which the defendant was held

incommunicado and questioned at intermittent
sessions of several hours' duration. On Monday
morning the defendant was questioned for two
hours, during which time he was permitted to
talk to his employer. That afternoon the
defendant was transferred, ostensibly for his
protection, from the local jail to the state
prison. At the prison, the defendant was kept
isolated from the other prisioners and, during
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the following week, was questioned almost
daily at sessions lasting for several hours. On
Thursday the defendant's father requested
and was denied permission to see him. That
evening, in response to questions asked by
police, the defendant made a tape recorded
confession. The confession consisted largely of
yes-or-no answers to questions asked by police.
On Saturday, a lawyer was denied permission
to see the defendant and, the next day, the
defendant was permitted his first contact with
friends. The following Tuesday, the tenth day
of his detention, the defendant made a second
confession, consisting of answers to questions,
which was transcribed by police and signed by
the defendant.
Following this confession, the defendant' was
arraigned on a charge of burglary with intent
to commit rape. At the trial, the court ruled the
confession voluntary and admissible. The
defendant did not testify regarding the procurement of the confessions because of the trial
court's ruling that such testimony would
subject the defendant to unlimited crossexamination concerning the offense. Following
the affirmance of the defendant's conviction
by the Supreme Court of Alabama, the defendant petitioned for and was granted certiorari
by the United States Supreme Court. That
Court, with three members dissenting, reversed
the defendant's conviction, holding that "the
use of the confession secured in this setting
was a denial of due process" in violation of the
fourteenth amendment. Fikes v. Alabama, 77
Sup. Ct. 281 (1957).
The Court noted that there was no evidence
of physical brutality and indicated that elements which were present in prior cases in
which the Court had held confessions coerced
were not present in this case. However, the
Court said, the determination of whether a
confession has been obtained in violation of
due process depends "upon a weighing of the
circumstances of pressure against the power of
resistance of the person confessing. What
would be overpowering to the weak of will or
mind might be utterly ineffective against an
experienced criminal." In the present case the
Court considered significant the ten-day delay
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in arraignment, in violation of state law, during
which the defendant, an uneducated Negro
characterized as "schizophrenic and highly
suggestible", was not permitted to communicate with either a lawyer or friends. "The
totality of the circumstances," the Court said,
"that preceded the confessions in this case goes
far beyond the allowable limits."
Mr. Justice Frankfurter, in a concurring
opinion, emphasized that no single one of the
circumstances portrayed would by itself violate
due process. In regard to the absence of physical brutality, Justice Frankfurter saw no
difference "between the subversion of freedom
of the will through physical punishment and the
sapping of the will appropriately to be inferred
from the circumstances of this case." Commenting upon the delay in arraignment, it was
said that, while such delay, even though violative of state law, is not a denial of due process,
"it is to disregard experience not to recognize
that the ordinary motive for such extended
failure to arraign is not unrelated to the purpose of extracting a confession."
The dissent contended that the majority had
overstepped its function of enforcing the
fourteenth amendment and had interfered in a
state's administration of its criminal laws.
There was neither physical brutality, the
dissent said, nor that degree of psychological
coercion usually associated with a due process
violation. The questioning of the defendant, it
was said, was intermittent and never exceeded
two or three hours at a time. The delay in
arraignment, the dissent said, was not an
unusual practice. In the absence of anything
that "shocks the conscience," the dissent
concluded, the Court should not interfere in
state activities.
Confession Naming Co-Conspirators Held
Admissible-The defendant Paoli and four
co-defendants were indicted in a charge of
conspiracy to evade the federal alcohol tax.
After the termination of the alleged conspiracy,
co-defendant Whitley prepared and signed a
confession which directly implicated defendant
Paoli in the crime. At the conspirators' joint
trial in a federal district court, the confession
was admitted into evidence despite Paoli's
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objection. The trial court refused to delete
references in the confession to Paoli's part in
the conspiracy. However, the court instructed
the jury that the confession was to be used
solely for determining the guilt of Whitley, the
confessor, and not for ascertaining the guilt of
any other defendant. Following the defendants'
conviction, Paoli appealed, alleging error in the
admission of Whitley's confession. The United
States Supreme Court, with four members
dissenting, affirmed the defendants' conviction,
holding that a confession of one co-conspirator
which implicates others and is made after
termination of the conspiracy, is admissible in
evidence at a joint trial of the conspirators, if
the judge instructs the jury to consider the
confession only in regard to the declarant's
guilt. Paoli v. United States, 77 Sup. Ct. 294

(1957).
It is well settled, the Court said, that a
declaration of one conspirator, made in furtherance of the conspiracy and prior to its termination, may be used against the other
conspirators. In addition, it was said, such a
declaration made after termination of the conspiracy, may be used only against the declarant
and pursuant to an appropriate jury instruction. A difficult problem, the majority noted,
is presented when the conspirators are tried
together and a confession directly implicating
the group is sought to be admitted in evidence
against one member of the conspiracy. The
issue presented is whether the trial court's
instruction to the jury, limiting use of the
confession to determining the declarant's
guilt, sufficiently protected the other defendants. In the present case, the Court said, the
conspiracy was simple in character and the
roles of each defendant were easy to understand. In addition, it was said, no request for
separate trial was made. The trial court's
instructions were clear and were repeated at
several points during the trial. Furthermore, the Court emphasized, a jury must
be presumed to follow the court's instruction.
"To say that the jury might have been confused," the majority concluded, "amounts to
nothing more than an unfounded speculation
that the jurors disregarded clear instructions

of the court in arriving at their verdict. Our
theory of trial relies upon the ability of a jury
to follow instructions."
The dissent criticized the majority for relying
upon the jury's ability to disregard prejudicial
evidence. "The fact of the matter is," the
dissent said, "that too often such admonition
against misuse is intrinsically ineffective in
that the effect of such a nonadmissible declaration cannot be wiped from the brains of the
jurors." Since the prosecution, the dissent said,
could have avoided the possibility of unfairness
by trying the defendants at separate trials,
"the Government should not have the windfall
of having the jury be influenced by evidence
against a defendant which, as a matter of law,
they should not consider but which they cannot
put out of their minds."
Tape Recording Held Admissible to Impeach Witness-Prior to the defendant's trial
on a charge of driving while intoxicated, the
sheriff and the prosecutor had a conversation
during which the sheriff told the prosecutor
that he would testify that the defendant was
drunk when arrested. This conversation was
recorded by the prosecutor by means of a
concealed tape recorder without the knowledge
of the sheriff. At the trial, the sheriff testified
as a witness for the defendant. When asked
whether, in his opinion, the defendant was
drunk at the time he was placed in jail, the
sheriff replied that the defendant acted more
like a man who had been using narcotics than
like a man who was intoxicated. Thereafter,
the prosecution, for the purpose of impeaching
the sheriff, offered into evidence the recording
of the conversation had between the witness
and the prosecutor. The trial court, overruling
the defendant's objection, admitted the recording into evidence as a prior inconsistent
statement, for the purpose of impeaching the
witness. The portions of the recording which
were at variance with the testimony of the
sheriff were then played before the jury. The
Texas Court of Criminal Appeals, with one
member dissenting, affirmed the defendant's
conviction and approved the admission of the
evidence. Huston v. State, 296 S.W.2d 245 (Tex.
Crim. App. 1956).
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On appeal, the defendant maintained that
the use of a tape recording is an improper
method of impeaching a witness. In addition,
the defendant argued, the recording was inadmissible because it was obtained in violation
of the Federal Wire Tapping Act. The court
easily rejected the wire-tapping argument,
holding that the recording of the conversation
did not constitute an interception of a communication by wire or radio, as required by the
federal act, but was merely a recording of a
personal conversation.
As a further argument, the defendant contended that use of the recording deprived him
of his right to confront and cross-examine
opposing witnesses. In response, the court said
that the defendant's right of cross-examination was sufficiently preserved since the defendant had the opportunity to cross-examine
the prosecutor. The dissent supported the defendant's contention that use of the mechanical
recording device denied the defendant his constitutional right to cross-exmaine his opponent's
witnesses. "If the state can set a mechanical
device in the witness chair in the courtroom
and have it testify as a witness," the dissent
said, "there is noting to prevent it from having
witnesses record their testimony upon a mechanical device and, upon the trial of the case,
have that mechanical device testify to such
a statement."
Witness Granted Immunity from State
Prosecution must Testify before State Grand
Jury Despite Active Cooperation between
Federal and State Authorities-The defendant
was subpoenaed by a New York grand jury
and ordered to testify regarding the alleged
bribery of labor union representatives. At the
hearing, the defendant refused to testify, invoking the privilege against self-incrimi'nation
provided by the state constitution. The grand
jury, pursuant to the New York immunity
statute, then accorded the defendant immunity
from prosecution by New York authorities
for crimes which might be revealed by his
testimony and renewed the order that he testify. Maintaining his refusal to answer questions, the defendant contended that his
testimony would incriminate him under federal
law and that the state immunity act would not
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protect him from federal prosecution. Federal,
as well as state law, the defendant maintained,
made it a crime to bribe labor union officials.
The defendant argued that the local United
States district attorney had publicly expressed
an intention to cooperate with local state
authorities in the prosecution of cases involving
the bribery of labor representatives. In addition, the defendant said, the local state's
attorney intended to cooperate with federal
authorities in the prosecution of such offenses
in the federal courts. Thus, it was contended,
the defendant's testimony would place him in
imminent danger of federal prosecution if he
were required by state authorities to incriminate himself. Upon his continued refusal to
testify, the defendant was committed for
contempt. On appeal, the Supreme Court of
New York affirmed, holding that, where there
is active co-operation between state and federal
authorities in prosecuting crimes prohibited
by both federal and state laws, a witness
accorded immunity from state prosecution
may not invoke the privilege against selfincrimination. Knapp v. Schweitzer, 157
N.Y.S. 2d 158 (Sup. Ct. App. Div. 1st Dep't.
1956).
The privilege against self-incrimination of
the fifth amendment to the United States
Constitution, the court pointed out, does not
apply to state tribunals. Nevertheless, the
court said, that privilege is provided by the
New York constitution. While the validity of
its state immunity act does not depend upon
its ability to afford a witness protection
against prosecution, the court said that "we
cannot in fair compliance with our own constitution remain insensible to the actual dangers of nonimmunized compulsory incrimination in the United States courts where we
compel testimony in the ever broadening areas
and in subjects affected by the criminal laws
of both governments. And while we can exercise
no control over federal practice, we can exercise
a judicial supervision over state enforcement
officers." The general rule, the court said, is
that federal authorities are not precluded from
initiating a prosecution because of a state's
action in compelling a defendant to incriminate
himself. However, the court said, an analysis

CRIMINAL LAW CASE NOTES AND COMMENTS

of federal decisions in this area and in the
analogous area of illegal search and seizure
indicates that federal courts would refuse to
prosecute a witness compelled by state authorities to incriminate himself where there was
co-operation between federal and state law
enforcement officials. For this reason, the
court concluded, "a state prosecuting officer
investigating an area in which the criminal
laws of both the federal and state governments
operate together, and requiring immunized
testimony in the development of his case,
could himself give adequacy to state constitutional safeguards by tendering cooperation with
the appropriate United States attorney."
Motion to Suppress Evidence Constitutes
an Admission against Interest-On the basis of
evidence seized by federal agents armed with a
search warrant, the defendants were indicted
for violation of the federal alcohol tax laws.
Prior to their arraignment before a federal
magistrate, the defendants' attorneys filed a
motion to suppress the evidence on the grounds
that it was procured through an illegal search
and seizure. The motion, which was signed
only by the attorneys, alleged that the seized
property belonged to the defendants. At the
hearing on the motion the defendant Fowler
testified that the evidence belonged to him.
The defendant Scott, on the other hand, repudiated the allegations contained in the
motion and testified that he had no interest in
the seized evidence. The motion was overruled.
During the trial, the court admitted the motion
into evidence against both defendants. Scott's
testimony alleging ownership of the property
was also admitted, while Fowler's testimony,
denying ownership in the evidence, was excluded. The court instructed the jury that the
motion was signed by the defendants' attorneys
and that "the defendants are bound by their
statements." On appeal from their conviction,
the United States Court of Appeals for the
Tenth Circuit held that a motion to suppress,
together with the testimony in support of the
motion, where the motion is overruled, is
admissible in evidence as an admission against
interest. However, the court further held that
the motion is not admissible where it is signed
only by the defendants' attorneys and not by

the parties themselves. Fowler v. United Slates,
239 F.2d 93 (10th Cir. 1956).
A motion to suppress, the court said, constitutes an admission by the moving party that
he is the owner of the incriminating evidence.
The court indicated, however, that such a
motion should not be admissible where the
trial court sustains the motion. The prosecution, the court said, should not have the benefit
of evidence found to be unlawfully acquired.
Where the motion is overruled, on the other
hand, and the evidence is found to have been
lawfully acquired, the motion and testimony in
its support is a valid admission against interest.
However, the court said, it is well settled that
pleadings from former cases which are not
under oath and are signed only by the parties'
attorneys, are incompetent as admissions. A
motion to suppress, the court said, is in the
same category as such a pleading and is therefore inadmissible where it is signed only by the
defendants' attorneys.
Black-Out of Epileptic Motorist Constitutes
Criminal Negligence-As the result of an
automobile accident, the defendant, an individual subject to epileptic attacks, was
indicted on a charge of criminal negligence.
The applicable statute provided that "a person
who operates or drives any vehicle of any kind
in a reckless or culpably negligent manner,
whereby a human being is killed, is guilty of
criminal negligence in the operation of a
vehicle resulting in death." The indictment
alleged that the defendant "kitowiig that he
was subject to epileptic attacks rendering him
likely to lose consciousness was culpably
negligent in that he consciously undertook to
and did operate his sedan on a public highway
and while so doing suffered such an attack
which caused his automobile" to travel at a
reckless rate of speed, jump the curb and fatally
injure four pedestrians. At the trial, the defendant demurred to the indictment, alleging
that it did not charge a crime. The trial court
overruled the demurrer and the defendant was
convicted. On appeal, the Court of Appeals of
New York, with two members dissenting, while
granting a new trial on other grounds, affirmed
the validity of the indictment, holding that a
person who operates an automobile with
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knowledge that he is subject to epileptic to the conscious manipulation of the controls
seizures, whose vehicle goes out of control of the vehicle. It encompasses, the court held,
while he is having an attack and kills others, is driving with knowledge that the driver's
guilty of criminal negligence. People v. Decina, physical condition renders the operation of a
157 N. Y. S. 2d 558 (1956).
vehicle perilous to others. People v. Eckert.
The essence of the crime of criminal 157 N.Y.S. 2d 551 (1956).
negligence, the court said, is "conduct which
Presence of Federal Employees On Grand
manifests a disregard of the consequences which Jury Does Not Invalidate Federal Indictmentmay ensue from the act, and indifference to the The defendant had been indicted by a grand
jury for the offense of unlawfully refusing to
rights of others." In the present case, the court
said, the defendant knew that he might suffer answer questions before a United States Senate
an attack at any time. He also knew that an committee. Thereafter, the defendant made a
uncontrolled vehicle on a public highway is a motion to dismiss the indictment on the
dangerous instrumentality. "With this knowl- grounds that fourteen members of the grand
edge," it was said, "and without anyone jury which returned the indictment were fedaccompanying him, he deliberately took a eral employees and, the defendant alleged, were
chance by making a conscious choice of a course therefore biased and prejudiced against the
of action, in disregard -of the consequences defendant. In addition, the defendant claimed,
which he knew might follow. His awareness of a such employees may have feared possible
condition which he knows may produce such investigation by federal authorities if they had
consequences," the court concluded, "renders voted against the indictment. The court denied
the motion, holding that grand jurors are not
him liable for culpable negligence."
The dissent maintained that the language of subject to disqualification for bias. United
States v. Knowles, 147 F.Supp. 19 (D.D.C.
the statute made criminal only "vehicle
operation in a culpably negligent manner" 1957).
The legal qualifications of grand jurors, the
which results in a fatality. The defendant's
indictment charged that the acts of the auto- court said, relate to such matters as citizenship,
residence and the ability to read and write.
mobile were caused by the defendant's loss of
consciousness. The defendant, the dissent said, Challenges for bias or for causes other than
was not charged with operating the vehicle in a lack of legal qualifications, it was said, are not
reckless manner. Culpably negligent driving, as permissible. The function of grand jurors, the
court indicated, does not require that they be
required by the statute, the dissent argued,
presupposes consciousness. "It does not touch impartial. A grand jury, the court said, is only
at all," it was said, "the involuntary presence of an accusatory body, and does not determine
an unconscious person at the wheel of an un- guilt. In addition, it was said, in contrast to
controlled vehicle." The dissent maintained petit juries, there is no constitutional requirement that a grand jury be impartial. Furtherthat the construction of the statute formulated
by the majority would make driving a crime more, the court said, it is inconceivable that a
for anyone suffering from a wide variety of government employee would fear government
reprisal if he voted against an indictment for a
common ailments which might conceivably
cause unconsciousness. "Such a construction of federal crime. Moreover, the court concluded,
"to investigate a grand juror who happens to be
a criminal statute," the dissent concluded,
"offends against due process and against
a government employee in order to determine
whether he might have had a dread of adverse
justice and fairness."
In a companion case involving similar facts, consequences if he voted to ignore the charge,
the New York court, upholding an epileptic may, in itself, be a form of intimidation against
voting in favor of an indictment in any similar
motorist's conviction for criminal negligence,
reasoned that the statute does not merely apply case in the future."
(For other recent case abstracts see "Police Science Legal Abstracts andNotes", infra pp. 116-123.)

